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The recently published report Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers
(the Albright-Cohen Report) is a welcome addition to the growing efforts to realize the
often invoked promise, ‘‘Never again.’’1 In fact, it constitutes the first attempt to
translate the existing research on genocide prevention into a policy guide for decision
makers, and it deserves praise for taking this step. In particular, from a European
perspective, one would hope that institutions and actors such as the Imperial War
Museum in London, the International Task Force for Holocaust Education, Research
and Remembrance, and the Stiftung fu¨r Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin will engage
in similar work to add new perspectives and inspire European leaders.
Being the first of its kind, the Albright-Cohen Report invites a number of
criticisms. This cannot come as a surprise, and it may, indeed, help to generate further
debate and reflection. My focus here will be on the relationship between genocide
prevention and international law. From a legal perspective, there are numerous
obvious links between the two—of course, one might say, given that the crime
of genocide is defined in a legal instrument, the UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). Nonetheless, the treatment of
international law in the report remains inconsistent and insufficient. Most often, law
is reduced to ‘‘international political challenges’’ (75; emphasis added) or is accorded
even less importance. This approach corresponds well with the state of art in the field
of genocide studies, where much ink is still spilled on criticizing the alleged and real
shortcomings of the legal definition instead of scrutinizing newer developments. The
Albright-Cohen Report should have done better and explored how recent trends in
international law could contribute and shape future policies in the field of genocide
prevention.
The Albright-Cohen Report and International Law
On a number of occasions the report does touch on the interplay between genocide
prevention and international law. Chapter six is in fact titled ‘‘International Action:
Strengthening Norms and Institutions,’’ and references are made to legal concepts
such as the responsibility to protect (xxi) and to institutions such as the International
Criminal Court (101ff).2 Some of the recommendations set forth are very agreeable,3
while others seem totally unrealistic;4 overall, there is little self-critical assessment of
past US policies vis-a`-vis international law.5 What is more, legal tools appear to be
relegated to a secondary category, appended to and dependent on political considera-
tions. An example of this approach occurs in the brief discussion of the potential need
to initiate military operations when no UN authorization can be obtained. On the one
hand, the report slurs over the fact that the use of force is generally prohibited under
international law (97).6 On the other hand, it ignores the fact that the United States
has no official policy supporting the existence of a right to humanitarian intervention.7
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In what follows I shall highlight some of the report’s shortcomings vis-a`-vis
international law and point to one particular and major omission: the failure to
address the legal duty of the United States to prevent genocide.
(a) The Legal Definition of Genocide as ‘‘Definitional Trap’’ for
Genocide Prevention
The Albright-Cohen Report begins by discussing the scope of genocide prevention,
calling this ‘‘Defining the Challenge.’’ Should prevention focus on genocide alone, or
should it also address crimes against humanity and other massive violations of human
rights? Does genocide prevention depend on a determination of genocide? The task
force behind the report defines the scope of the Blueprint ‘‘as the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities, meaning large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians’’
(xxi). A number of recent developments, such as the mandate of the UN’s Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the scope of the responsibility to protect, and
the newly discovered legal duty to prevent genocide, all point in this same direction.
While lawyers were the first to call genocide the ‘‘crime of crimes,’’8 they have since
moved beyond the notion of a hierarchy of suffering. Today, there is a growing
readiness to view genocide together with other international crimes—and not only in
terms of prevention. A very pertinent proposal has been made by David Scheffer, who
for the purposes of prevention, suggests speaking of ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ precisely to
avoid the ‘‘definitional traps’’ to which the Albright-Cohen Report refers.9 The atrocity
crimes terminology allows us to focus the debate on how to respond to a given crisis
instead of spending time and energy discussing whether or not the strict requirements
of the legal definition of genocide have been met.
Although the report does not mention Scheffer’s work,10 it includes a similar
proposal, explaining that the authors’ ‘‘central purpose . . . [is] prevention’’ and that
they advocate ‘‘the adoption of measures before acts of massive violence have been
committed or labeled’’ (xxii). This makes a lot of sense. If the objective is to prevent
genocide from happening, international efforts must logically be comprehensive,
broader than the narrow notion of genocide, in order to prevent just that. Ideally,
prevention measures will keep a situation from escalating into genocidal violence so
that there will be no genocide. For this reason, any effective genocide-prevention policy
also needs to combat crimes against humanity and other grave violations of human
rights that could progress to genocide. The term ‘‘genocide’’ is often invoked by activists
or the media in the belief that only this particular crime will engage the broader public
and lead to a decisive response. The increased level of international interest in
the Darfur crisis following the invocation of the term ‘‘genocide’’ seems to confirm the
power of the ‘‘G-word’’; at the same time, however, this situation also shows the term’s
inherent dangers. There continues to be disagreement about the appropriateness of
labeling Darfur a genocide, as well as problems in some quarters with realizing that,
even in a case of genocide, the situation on the ground may be more difficult than a
fight between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘evil.’’ ‘‘Genocide,’’ in its simplified public usage, often seems
to blur observers’ ability to analyze and understand the relevant conflict.
It therefore comes as a surprise when the authors make a 180-degree turn,
announcing that the report will ‘‘use the term genocide as a shorthand expression for
[a] wider category of crimes’’ (xxii). This is boldly inconsistent and cannot convince.
The same report warns that ‘‘legalistic arguments [as to whether or not a certain crisis
fulfills the legal definition of genocide] have repeatedly impeded timely and effective
action’’ (xxi)—yet still opts to use the term ‘‘genocide.’’ It is deplorable that the
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Albright-Cohen Report, instead of sustaining its own arguments, falls for what it calls
the ‘‘unmatched rhetorical power’’ of the term ‘‘genocide’’ (xxi).11 A comprehensive
approach, addressing all atrocity crimes, could put an end to lengthy and tiring
debates over whether or not certain crimes—for example, those committed in the
Darfur region—constitute genocide. Such a policy would be more effective than current
efforts and would eventually also help to establish an understanding that, ‘‘depending
upon the circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity and
large scale war crimes may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.’’12
(b) Impunity as Obstacle to Genocide Prevention—or as Bargaining Chip?
The question of accountability for genocide and other crimes against humanity is
another area of concern addressed in the Albright-Cohen Report. But on this point, too,
the report seriously lacks consistency and coherence. At the outset, in a section titled
‘‘Early Prevention: Engaging Before the Crisis,’’ the report states that impunity is a
serious challenge to genocide prevention (46). Indeed, where there is no accountability
for violations of human rights, criminal policies can more easily be implemented.
Without the rule of law to distinguish right from wrong, no individual perpetrator will
worry about the prospect of future trials. The significant detrimental effect of impunity
is a standard feature of the literature on genocide prevention and is stressed by both
genocide scholars and inter-governmental organizations. Moreover, it seems increas-
ingly realistic to view the prospect of prosecutions before an international tribunal as
potentially deterring future mass atrocities. While this once was a far-fetched scenario,
the growing number of international tribunals, the existence of a permanent
International Criminal Court, and the supplementary use of national prosecutions
in third states (under the title of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’—a concept that is omitted
from the report) do seem to have an impact on the ground.13 Thus, the report is right to
assert that ‘‘threatening legal and moral accountability for violations of international
law . . . signals potentially serious repercussions for inexcusable behavior’’ (43).
In this context, it is important to acknowledge and consider that this threat of
prosecution as means of prevention can prove very costly. Only briefly mentioned
in the report, this fact is starkly illustrated by the response of Sudan’s President
Al-Bashir to the ICC’s arrest warrant. Is justice to be pursued even if it means that the
conflict will be prolonged and that more people will die? Who is to make that decision?
Proponents of international criminal justice must face these questions and must be
prepared to deal with the unintended consequences of ICC investigations. The report
claims that
responsible members of the international community, including the United States, have
concluded that the potential benefits do indeed outweigh the costs, and they
are unlikely again to allow disputes over the means of pursuing justice to overwhelm
the principle that justice must be done. (103).
This assessment is overly optimistic. The ongoing debates surrounding the Bashir case
before the ICC illustrate that there is no such agreement yet, not even among
‘‘responsible’’ Western states or among ICC member states.
The report also lacks consistency with respect to fighting impunity, readily
proposing in a separate section that accountability be used as a bargaining chip.
Discussing policy options and ‘‘Tools Available to the United States to Help Halt and
Reverse Escalating Threats of Genocide and Mass Atrocities,’’ the report lists offering
amnesties and immunities among these tools (60ff, Table 1)14. This idea is obviously
irreconcilable with earlier statements in the report. Moreover, in trying to devise
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a policy on genocide prevention, it would have been better to shift the emphasis from
what combating impunity means for an ongoing conflict and what it means for future
conflicts and for potential perpetrators. If amnesties remain an ‘‘available tool,’’ even
within the context of genocide prevention, then potential ge´nocidaires need not fear
prosecution before the ICC or elsewhere.15 Furthermore, and equally importantly, it
seems very questionable whether amnesties and immunities still are ‘‘available tools’’
vis-a`-vis crimes against humanity such as genocide. It seems to be generally accepted
that international tribunals, at least, are not bound by national amnesties and
immunities; indeed, there is significant practice suggesting that contemporary
international law prohibits outright amnesties for crimes against humanity and
genocide. Is the Albright-Cohen Report suggesting that the United States place itself
outside this trend?
(c) The Responsibility to Protect
Several times throughout the report the authors refer to the notion of a responsibility
to protect (R2P). The most interesting contribution appears in chapter five,
‘‘Employing Military Options,’’ which makes a convincing case that the US government
(as well as many other actors) needs to translate R2P into concrete guidance for
military training and operations (73ff). Beyond that, however, the authors add little to
the existing literature. Indeed, the Albright-Cohen Report displays some difficulties
in properly situating R2P in the context of genocide prevention. For example, the
report suggests that R2P ‘‘provide[s] the legitimate basis for overriding national
sovereignty’’ (58)16—a serious misreading of what R2P is about, suited only to confirm
concerns among readers from developing countries that R2P could serve as a standing
excuse for US interventions. R2P is a significant departure from the traditional notion
of sovereignty as an impermeable iron wall, protecting murderous regimes—instead of
their people—from outside interference. At the same time, R2P confirms sovereignty
and is conceived as its ‘‘ally, not [its] adversary.’’17 Thus, it would be more appropriate
to explore how R2P can contribute to efforts to prevent atrocity crimes, instead
of deliberating (belated) military interventions.
The report’s only concrete recommendation on R2P is that the new US
administration should reaffirm the commitment of the United States to this concept.
R2P has indeed become a buzzword at the United Nations, and it deserves close
attention. Adopted at the UN World Summit of heads of state in 2005, R2P was meant
to go beyond the old debates on the legality of armed (‘‘humanitarian’’) interventions
into internal conflicts and massive human-rights violations without UN authorization.
According to the doctrine of R2P, state sovereignty confers on a government
a responsibility to protect its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity; other states and the international community have a
responsibility to support the government in this undertaking. If a state ‘‘manifestly’’
fails in its responsibility, ‘‘the international community . . . [is] prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the [UN] Charter,’’ to protect the affected people.18 R2P is thus
not simply a remake of the older idea of ‘‘humanitarian intervention’’ but a new,
comprehensive norm that builds and expands on the classic understanding of
sovereignty and obliges both individual states and the international community as a
whole to prevent, react, and rebuild. R2P is not yet binding law but is often described
as ‘‘evolving’’ in that direction. Be that as it may, R2P was introduced on a broad basis
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of international support, adopted at the highest level and in consensus by the UN
General Assembly, and later reaffirmed by the UN Security Council.19
The Albright-Cohen Report calls R2P the ‘‘potentially most important normative
addition’’ since the drafting of the UNCG—but does not translate this into concrete
policies, instead reducing R2P to a tool of ‘‘moral suasion’’ (98). While the Darfur
crisis and the enduring inability of the international community to fundamentally
change the situation on the ground pose extreme challenges to R2P, there is also good
news—which reinforces the need for this report, and any future genocide-prevention
policy, to engage with R2P. For example, R2P was successfully invoked by former
UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and others in mediating the post-election crisis
in Kenya early in 2008.20 In July 2009, UN member states will discuss how
to implement R2P in the UN General Assembly, on the basis of a comprehensive
report by the UN secretary-general (published on 12 January 2009, after publication
of the Albright-Cohen Report) that presents first suggestions on how to operationalize
R2P.21
(d) The Legal Duty to Prevent Genocide
If we have so far focused on areas in which the report’s treatment of international legal
matters is insufficient or inconsistent, we now turn to an issue that is omitted
completely. On 26 February 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—the
highest judicial organ of the United Nations, which hears disputes between states and
does not deal with the criminal responsibility of individuals—rendered a judgment in a
case between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Bosnia had asked the Court to rule that
Serbia had violated the UNCG, and the judges did indeed find that this was the case;
the Court specified, however, that Serbia was not, in a legal sense, responsible for the
genocidal massacre committed at Srebrenica in July 1995. Instead, the Court ruled
that Serbia had violated two legal duties enshrined in the UNCG: first, the duty to
punish ge´nocidaires present on its territory, and, second and independently, the duty
to prevent genocide—outside its own territory.22
This legal duty to prevent genocide is, of course, directly relevant to the matter
discussed in the Albright-Cohen Report. After decades of protracted debates, the
United States ratified the UNCG in 1988 and is thus bound by this duty.23 To start
with, this duty could—and, indeed, should—serve as one reason for the United States
to formulate a policy on genocide prevention: it is, as a matter of law, legally obliged to
prevent genocide. This is important, as the US government has been very reluctant to
accept such duties in the past. In spring 1994, for example, the US government
meticulously avoided calling the massive crimes committed in Rwanda by their
rightful name (i.e., genocide); legal experts within the State Department warned the
administration to ‘‘be careful’’ because calling it genocide ‘‘could commit the US
[government] to actually do something.’’24 This reluctance again became evident
in how the aforementioned R2P doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005.25 It is a
glaring omission that this new development in international law is not even
mentioned, let alone discussed, in the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s report.26
The ICJ found the legal duty to prevent genocide established under the very first
provision of the UNCG.27 Article 1 reads, ‘‘The Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.’’28 While this may
seem to the layperson the most natural, perhaps even self-evident, reading of an
international treaty through which states aim to prevent and punish genocide, this
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part of the ruling did come as a surprise to international lawyers: prior to the ICJ’s
judgment, few had read a legal duty to prevent genocide as existing under the UNCG.
Most believed that art. 1 entailed only a programmatic statement, not a legal duty.29
In the context of formulating a policy on genocide prevention, therefore, this newly
stated duty is of course an interesting development. What exactly is the scope of this
obligation, and what does it mean for the US government?
The Court’s judgment addresses these questions and formulates some conditions to
help measure whether states comply with the duty to prevent genocide. Importantly,
the Court decided that the ‘‘the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of
result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever
the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide.’’30 There is little room for
excuses, however, as states are expected ‘‘to employ all means reasonably available
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible’’; in fact, it is ‘‘irrelevant whether
the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had
employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent
the commission of genocide.’’31 Accordingly, a state incurs legal responsibility for
violating the UNCG ‘‘if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent
genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing
the genocide.’’32 The ICJ acknowledges that different states may have different
capacities to prevent genocide from being committed; the scope of the duty therefore
depends on factors such as geographic proximity and political influence. Any measure
taken to prevent genocide must comply with general international law (which, for
example, makes the unilateral use of force—often discussed as ‘‘humanitarian
interventions’’—very questionable). Finally, the Court addresses the issue of when
this legal duty applies. Calling it ‘‘absurd’’ in the context of prevention to wait until
genocide has been committed and determined to fit the legal definition, the ICJ’s
judgment holds that ‘‘a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act,
arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the
existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’’33 Thus, the ‘‘definitional
traps’’ referred to in the Albright-Cohen Report should not stop states in their
endeavors: the question is not whether a certain crisis constitutes genocide but
whether it could evolve into genocide. There is a link and potential overlap between the
duty to prevent genocide and the responsibility to protect.
Even though judgments of the ICJ are legally binding only on the parties to the
case in question, it is clear that all other parties to the UNCG are under the same
obligation. What about the United States, then? On 9 September 2004, Colin Powell,
then US secretary of state, informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the
results of the Atrocities Documentation Project, stating that ‘‘genocide has been
committed’’ in Darfur.34 This was a significant shift away from the attitude prevalent
in 1994, when the ‘‘G-word’’ was avoided at all costs—but was Powell correct in
claiming that ‘‘we have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government
to act responsibly’’? Was, and is, the United States meeting the requirements set forth
by the ICJ? What about other parties to the UNCG, such as China, Russia, and South
Africa? Does not a particular responsibility rest with the permanent members of the
UN Security Council, both because of their special status and because of their actual
influence on Sudan? These are questions genocide scholars as well as anti-genocide
activists need to explore. The Albright-Cohen Report’s failure to undertake the first
steps toward operationalizing this duty as it applies to the United States is a major
shortcoming.
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Concluding Observations
The Albright-Cohen Report sets out to ‘‘enable the United States to take preventive
action, together with international partners, to forestall the specter of future cases
of genocide and mass atrocities’’ (ix). In terms of incorporating and making use of
international law in this task, the report has a number of shortcomings. Nonetheless,
the authors and institutions behind the report deserve credit for engaging with this
important topic and for putting it on the agenda. It is to be hoped that the institutions
involved in authoring the report will succeed in bringing this matter to the attention of
the new US administration. Moreover, it would seem advisable to follow up on the
report; there could, for example, be an annual genocide-prevention report to review
ongoing policies and make recommendations for the future. As the UN secretary-
general recently stated, ‘‘We can, and must, do better.’’35
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